George Homans, in his book Social Behaviour (1961) famously wrote:
Evidence scholarship and comparative law should be able to profit considerably from each other. Evidence scholarship aims to optimize the fact finding process in law, relying on insights from mathematics, psychology and the natural sciences. This experimental, experience-based ethos of science should sit comfortably with the aims and methods of comparative law. What better argument for the reform of the law of evidence is there than one which can cite not only scientific evidence indicating that a certain way of presenting evidence is cognitively optimal, but also that it has already stood the test of time in another legal system? What better warning against a proposed reform than the negative experience of another legal system? To combine scientific and comparative legal arguments in such a way requires a certain standard of explanation and prediction that at least tries to match those of the other sub-domains of evidence scholarship. Theorists in comparative law have all too often behaved like the theorist described by Homans. Categories and broad classifications exist in abundance: legal families, systems, traditions, common law countries vs civil law countries, adversarial vs inquisitorial, statute based vs precedent based, formal vs substantive, rational vs irrational-and the list continues. More recently, theorists in comparative law have extended this approach to their own discipline, now classifying different families in comparative law scholarship in addition to the different families of law simpliciter. In these meta-classifications, functionalist schools of comparison are juxtaposed with structuralist approaches, which include (in the opinion of many commentators) comparative law and culture. This distinction is not purely academic, but results in different policies. Functionalists, by and large, tend to be convergence enthusiasts. For them, seeing a legal rule perform a specific function in an optimal way in a foreign system is a prima facie reason to transplant it to one's own system, provided agreement is reached over the desirability of that function. In the law of evidence, the functionalist will analyse evidentiary rules for their scientific reliability and advocate the use of those rules that optimize the fact finding process. Structuralists tend to be convergence sceptics. For them, the meaning of legal rules is strictly determined by the entirety of their cultural and political environment, even the most minuscule divergence in general culture is a prima facie reason against transplanting a legal concept from one context to another. Applied to the law of evidence, structuralists will not assume that evidentiary rules fulfil only the purpose of establishing truth, but the entirety of culturespecific values.
Whilst the debate between these schools has created an increasingly sophisticated conceptual vocabulary, the 'sentences' that establish relations between these concepts are more often than not missing. The 'explanations' provided by comparative law are, as a result, often either weak, arbitrary or circular. Homans' 'Ah-ha' effect sees to this. Divergence between, say, German and US provisions in this approach can always be 'explained' by pointing out their membership in different classificatory groups-say common and civil law The correctness of these classifications is in turn argued for by looking at the divergence of individual rules, creating the impression of circularity. Professor Damaška's insightful and carefully argued paper goes a long way to develop, so to speak, a 'grammar of comparative law'. He shows how thorough doctrinal analysis of specific legal rules, traditional comparative law concepts (such as adversarial vs inquisitorial) and broader cultural concepts can combine in a syntactically structured way to produce the seedling of 'comparative law theories'. 'Comparative law theories' should not be understood here as abstract 'theories about comparative law' of which we have plenty. In the way the expression is used here, they are an attempt to move comparative law beyond the merely descriptive or even classificatory to the level of 'science' as Homans might have understood it.
An important aspect of Damaška's analysis addresses indirectly the question of the status of the 'functionalism vs structuralism' dichotomy. Quite often, the adherence to one school or the other is seen as a lifestyle choice, or to use the academically correct vocabulary, a case of paradigmatic incommensurability. If this were true one would have to decide in advance whether one considers structuralist explanations of the empirical material, or functionalist models as appropriate. Because this is a disagreement about what constitutes 'evidence' or 'proof' in comparative law, the relative merits of differing explanations provided by the two schools cannot be resolved by inducing even more empirical material. Instead, any decision for choosing a structuralist over a functionalist explanation (or vice versa) in a specific case is determined by the general, abstract a priori arguments for adopting one approach over the other. This has considerable practical implications. Since functionalists and structuralists, as noted above, will frequently disagree on whether a specific legal rule should be transplanted from one system to another, the inability in principle to settle their argument on the merits of the specific case will mean that comparative law as a discipline loses much of its critical, emancipatory potential. If the theoretical choice predetermines whether transplanting a foreign legal solution is desirable for instance to improve the legal fact finding process, any such recommendation or rejection remains arbitrary and empty, and comparative law disappears as a source of inspiration for law reform. Damaška's successful 'mixed' analysis shows that this need not be the case. Rather, his analysis of the Janus face of apparently irrational fact-finding mechanisms such as ordeals shows how we can understand concepts from structural and functional analysis as concepts within a unified methodology of comparative law, and the task of the comparative theorist to establish relations between them.
Cultural explanations of the legal rules of evidence can co-exist with the recognition that legal systems are at least partially transparent from the outside, and communication and learning across legal systems is, in principle, possible. However, the 'sentences' that link concepts from cultural and functional analysis have a recurrent pattern in Damaška's analysis, one in which typically the cultural analysis restricts the scope of the functional analysis, thus changing the enthusiastic recommendation of the latter ('transplant the cognitive optimal fact-finding rule by all means') to a more cautious one ('transplant if you must, but be aware that you might have to change more than anticipated').
In the remainder of this paper, I want to pose some constructive questions concerning the resulting epistemological status of 'comparative law theories of rules of evidence', including Damaška's own analysis. Let us return, for a moment, to the metaphor of language, thesaurus and grammar. Damaška's analysis shows in a number of case studies how different comparative law concepts and positive rules of evidence can be linked 'syntactically' to form comparative law theories, indicating a 'language of comparative law'. Nevertheless, by choosing a case-based approach, he does not yet give us the full grammar book. Different languages put different constraints on the freedom with which speakers can combine concepts syntactically. English is a relatively liberal language, allowing the speaker considerable freedom of word order. Other languages, German for instance, place many more constraints on the speaker, prohibiting certain combinations of words and prescribing others. To push the analogy to its limits, Damaška develops a 'comparative English' with few or no general rules on how the different concepts can be combined. As a consequence, he can move freely between functionalist, legal-cultural and general cultural explanations of evidentiary rules, combining them at will and as the case demands. The questions I want to develop could be understood as a stepping stone towards a 'comparative German', an approach to the comparative analysis of evidence that still uses concepts from functionalist, legal-cultural and cultural approaches, but is more prescriptive as to how they can be combined.
As a first step, I wish to illustrate these rather abstract and metaphorical points with some examples. The most general 'syntactical' pattern that we encounter in Damaška's analysis, and indeed in most 'comparative law and culture' studies is the explanation of a legal rule by either its surrounding legal culture or the wider social environment. Damaška uses the example of the different attitude towards authority to explain differences in the court setting between continental European and Anglo-American legal systems. Even if we avoid the notion of 'causation' in favour of the more general 'explanation', the relationship between explanans and explanandum in these models is not as symmetrical as, for example, Weber's concept of 'co-evolution'. In particular, we rarely find the explanation of wider cultural attitudes through observations of the legal process. In some cases, this can pose a serious problem. Unreliable cultural stereotypes of deviant behaviour are often given as an argument for the sub-optimal fact-finding process in jury trials. To retain these cognitively sub-optimal procedures then needs an explanation in non-truth finding terms, for example a prevailing cultural value of democratic participation. What is often overlooked in this analysis is that legal stereotypes form part of a culture as much as non-legal ones. The ideal of the compassionate and independent-minded juror, promoted through such films as Twelve Angry Men, might well counterbalance other stereotypes prevalent in a culture. We can therefore contrast the syntax of the explanans-explanandum model that separates law (as explanandum) from culture (as explanans) from one where they form a mereological (part-whole) unity, where the constituent parts can influence each other. The explanansexplanandum syntax lends itself to transplantation sceptical theories. Once a law is taken out of its explanatory context into a new environment, this environment will either change it into something unrecognizable or create lasting tensions. This conforms with Damaška's sceptical conclusion concerning reform of the jury trial. In the part-whole syntax, this is still a possibility, but one that competes with the possibility that the transplanted law can change its surrounding legal and non-legal environment as much as it can be changed by it, opening more chances of ultimately successful adaptations.
Another consequence of the 'explanans' syntax is that it reifies and homogenizes both elements of the theory. The German law is explained by the German legal culture that is determined by the German culture-each of them not only identifiable as fixed objects, but also clearly distinguishable from their Anglo-American counterparts. We can see the problems that this creates in Damaška's most ambitious (and as he himself notices, most problematic) examples, the attempt to explain features of the inquisitorial continental system by reference to wider cultural attitudes towards authority. While this explanation fits criminal and administrative procedure in continental jurisdictions, civil procedure in continental Europe is adversarial. Since the explanans refers to European cultural attitudes in general, it remains a problem to explain how private lawyers have been sheltered from this influence. There are several strategies that a proponent of Damaška's analysis may now pursue, most of them requiring the combination of further elements within the comparative and epistemological vocabulary. One possibility is to discard the explanation as positively falsified. Alternatively, the theory could create a 'protective belt' around its main thesis, and introduce ad hoc observations about continental culture that explain civil procedure as an exception from the rule. In this case, the theory can become regressive, 'distinguishing' the original theory and reducing its applicability. The most promising strategy, from the perspective of the theory, would be to extend this model to civil litigation too, and to show that despite its superficial differences, it adheres to the same political ordering principle as identified by Damaška. If an explanation that initially fits only to a sub-culture of a legal system can be extended beyond this group, then the comparative theory is progressive, extending its application beyond the one initially intended.
I now want to extend this analysis, that follows broadly the epistemology of Imre Lakatos, to Damaška's overall analysis. There are two very different ways in which we can rationally reconstruct Damaška's account. I think both are consistent with his arguments, but they are mutually contradictory. In the first version, we commence with the dichotomy of inquisitorial vs adversarial systems and 'truth based' vs 'due process based' systems as a core assumption, almost a definition, of our theory. We commit ourselves in doing so to the cultural differences between these systems, a claim which as a result becomes immune against empirical refutation. This allows us to use the dichotomy as an explanation for differences in legal rules, such as the 'control over evidence'. Once we consider this pattern of explanation as successful, the concept of 'legal culture' takes on a dual role. On the one hand, it allows us to discover new examples of diverging rules (by contrasting relevant provisions in the two cultures). On the other hand, it serves as instant explanation for these differences. We will also encounter problematic evidence, examples of apparent convergence between the two different legal cultures. This then has to be explained. One possibility is to deny that the superficially similar rules have the same meaning in their respective cultural contexts. Alternatively, we can find cultural similarities that make the convergence plausible, for instance a commonly held belief in science that can be found in all Western societies. Note, however, that it is the belief in science that explains this convergence, not simply a scientific or cognitively optimal functioning of the rule.
In the second version, we take the prevalence of science in Western culture as a starting point. Given that Western cultures, since the Enlightenment, define themselves as scienceguided, we can predict a spirit of scientific inquiry and the pursuit of truth in all aspects of cultural life. Based on this assumption, convergence between different systems is positive evidence for our claim, and divergence is something that needs explanation. Damaška's paper mentions two strategies as to how this may operate. Firstly, we can try to argue that apparently unscientific forms of evidence are 'in reality' reliable given certain cultural preconditions. The protection of client attorney privilege has, for example, in the long run the effect that witnesses are more forthcoming with their statements. Secondly, we can explain the divergence from cognitively optimal rules of evidence by adducing other cultural values like fairness, privacy or societal peace. Differences in legal rules then reflect the different weight given to these values in different societies.
Both theories use the same elements, but combine them differently. They share their 'nouns', the theoretical concepts, but they use a different syntax. What is factual evidence in one is theoretical definition in the other; what functions as a protection against counter examples in one lends direct support for claims made in the alternative model. What counts as theoretical and what counts as factual changes places, depending on which starting point the investigator chooses and how 'self-evident' he considers the traditional classifications of comparative law to be. In practice, the two approaches will probably result in diverging advice as to whether or not the transplantation of an evidentiary rule is likely to be successful. The two claims have a different internal structure, thus their disagreement cannot simply be solved by looking for a crucial experiment to decide between them. We can however evaluate them by analysing their internal structural consistency.
For this purpose, we start with an important syntactical asymmetry that both models share. Rules of evidence can be cognitively sub-optimal in two ways. They can either disallow otherwise reliable evidence, or introduce unreliable evidence. Both reconstructions of Damaška's theory deal only with the first form of cognitively suboptimal models of fact-finding in the legal process. They are all exclusionary rules-they prevent certain reliable facts being introduced into the trial process, but do not mandate the introduction of specific facts. This asymmetry fits into the second model that takes the shared culture of science as a starting point and uses cultural explanations as a 'protective belt' in those cases where legal systems diverge. It does not fit as well to the first model, the one that starts with the idea of cultural divergence. If indeed different legal systems would radically differ in their epistemic values, we should expect to find, almost as frequently, rules that introduce evidence into the trial process despite being known to be scientifically unreliable. Now there might indeed be such rules. 'Fossilized' rules such as the oath, kept in a legal system despite an explicit recognition (within that system) that the conditions that gave it reliability are no longer present, might be examples. Another example might be irrefutable presumptions in the law of evidence. From this observation, we can develop a mini-research programme that replaces the focus on exclusionary rules and concentrates instead on the (less frequent and more obscure) 'constructive' non-scientific rules. If we would find systematic differences between legal systems in the way that legal systems make use of 'falsehood-inducing' rules, the model that claims that legal systems differ radically in their epistemic values gains in credibility.
Finally, we come back to a point made above. One of the syntactic features of Damaška's analysis is the juxtaposition of legal regulation of proof and scientific epistemology. Where the law falls short of the best scientific theories, we need an explanation in terms of wider cultural values. Again, structurally this follows from the explanandum-explanans model. In the mereological model, we should also consider a potential feedback mechanism between legal and scientific culture. Law and legal values might as much influence scientific practice as scientific practice and values influence the law of evidence. Indeed, scientific practice faces the same sort of exclusionary rules encountered in law. We experiment on animals, not humans, even if experiments on humans are cognitively vastly superior and more reliable for drug design. We require consent for the use of bodies of deceased people even if, scientifically speaking, insights gained from corpses without consent are just as reliable. Legal regulation of proof and scientific methods of fact-finding might therefore converge much more than usually acknowledged, at least if we understand science not as abstract epistemology but concrete cultural practice. For the comparative lawyer, this opens up new research questions. Are there patterns in the social practice of science peculiar to individual countries that are mirrored in its approach to proof in legal procedure? Do scientists in the US observe exclusionary rules that are ignored by their European colleagues, and do we find corresponding patterns in their laws of evidence? This would be a powerful argument for divergence theorists. To indicate some possible answers, the concept of the peer reviewed journal as scientific standard for instance is much more predominant in Anglo-American countries, countries that also use peer review in the form of jury trials in their legal system. Conversely, if we can establish universal patterns in the regulation of science as cultural practice, this would support convergence theorists, as it would indicate culturally shared standards of appropriateness in the pursuit of truth.
My reply shifted the focus from the question of the comparative epistemology of the law of evidence to the epistemology of comparative law itself. What is the nature of the evidence for comparative law theories of the law of evidence? Comparative evidence scholarship is faced with heterogeneous explanations. Rules of evidence can be explained either by analysing their scientific reliability, or by the wider legal or cultural context within which they operate. To adjudicate between competing explanations of the same legal rule requires therefore a methodology that can account for both types of arguments and possible combinations of them. My reply tried to show how Imre Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes fulfils this task. † Applied rather unsystematically to Professor Damaška's analysis, it opened more new questions than it answered. Measured against its own standards, this is the best we could hope for. † For a more systematic treatment, the reader is referred to SCHAFER, B. 1999 Form Follows Functions Fails. Social Epistemology, Vol. 13, pp. 113-128; and Lakatos' original work, LAKATOS, I. 1974 Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes, (A. Musgrave ed.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-197. 
